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IKImmanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant

Life dates: 1724 AD — 1804 AD

Kant distinguishes good will from favourable circumstances and questions whether reason can specify a universal path to happiness. Read the contrasts between morality, prudence and imagined satisfaction through the argument.

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Life and writing

The catalogue identifies Immanuel Kant with lifetime years 1724–1804 and names Thomas Kingsmill Abbott as translator of this English work. Matthew Stapleton receives the electronic preparation credit. The linked text separates sections moving from common moral knowledge toward philosophical principles. Its HTML ISBN identifies the electronic edition, not a checked original print. The related reading gives context for two archive extracts without assigning composition dates to them.

The opening of the First Section argues that good will is needed for a person to be worthy of happiness and examines how advantages can be used. This is an argument about moral value, not an assertion that poverty or misfortune proves wrongdoing. In the Second Section, Kant calls happiness an ideal of imagination while explaining why empirical consequences cannot yield a definite universal rule for achieving it. He distinguishes that difficulty from the demands of duty. The passage does not simply dismiss happiness as worthless. Both selected extracts match Abbott’s checked English translation.

Reading this voice

Read the opening discussion of good will before the contrast between happiness and duty in the Second Section. Track Kant’s use of worthiness and prudence, rather than treating favourable circumstances as proof of moral merit.

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Quotations and sayings

03c. 1764 AD
[A man] finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way? Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, Is it right? I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: How would it be if my maxim were a universal law? Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.
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06c. 1764 AD
[A man], who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress! Now no doubt, if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.
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16c. 1764 AD
It is true, no doubt, that this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself an identical and therefore an analytic proposition; but it shows, nevertheless, the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, a synthesis without which it would be impossible to think the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness. For through the *I*, as a simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from this representation, can a manifold be given, and then, through *combination*, be thought in one consciousness. An understanding in which through self-consciousness all the manifold would be given at the same time would be one that *intuits*; our understanding can do nothing but *think*, and must seek intuition in the senses. I am conscious, therefore, of the identical self with respect to the manifold of the representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all *my* representations, as constituting *one* intuition. This means that I am conscious *a priori* of a necessary synthesis of them, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, and under which all representations given to me must stand, but under which they must also be brought by means of a synthesis.”—from_Critique of Pure Reason_. Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by Marcus Weigelt, based on the translation by Max Müller, pp. 128-129
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