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Immanuel Kant

1724 AD — 1804 AD

Kant distinguishes good will from favourable circumstances and questions whether reason can specify a universal path to happiness. Read the contrasts between morality, prudence and imagined satisfaction through the argument.

Author and source reference ↗
▷ Play this voiceSearch within this voice ↗Place in time ↗lifeknowledgetruthtimefaithjusticemindcourage

Life and writing

The catalogue identifies Immanuel Kant with lifetime years 1724–1804 and names Thomas Kingsmill Abbott as translator of this English work. Matthew Stapleton receives the electronic preparation credit. The linked text separates sections moving from common moral knowledge toward philosophical principles. Its HTML ISBN identifies the electronic edition, not a checked original print. The related reading gives context for two archive extracts without assigning composition dates to them.

Project Gutenberg catalogue — Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals ↗Checked related reading — Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals ↗ Catalogue identity/lifetime and linked edition credits, framing or cast

The opening of the First Section argues that good will is needed for a person to be worthy of happiness and examines how advantages can be used. This is an argument about moral value, not an assertion that poverty or misfortune proves wrongdoing. In the Second Section, Kant calls happiness an ideal of imagination while explaining why empirical consequences cannot yield a definite universal rule for achieving it. He distinguishes that difficulty from the demands of duty. The passage does not simply dismiss happiness as worthless. Both selected extracts match Abbott’s checked English translation.

Checked related reading — Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals ↗ First Section; opening discussion of good will and worthiness of happiness; Second Section; happiness, imagination and prudence

Reading this voice

Read the opening discussion of good will before the contrast between happiness and duty in the Second Section. Track Kant’s use of worthiness and prudence, rather than treating favourable circumstances as proof of moral merit.

Subjects to explore

Editorial reading connections, distinct from the archive’s word matching.

A work to read

Begin with these archive passages

Editorial starting points from this author’s existing entries.

Profile sources and editorial status

Original agent-assisted editorial profile, checked 2026-10-05. No human review is recorded. Life dates are recorded to the year; they do not date individual quotations.

Archive entries

04Undated
Even if, by some especially unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of stepmotherly nature, [the good will] should be wholly lacking in the power to accomplish its purpose; if with the greatest effort it should yet achieve nothing, and only the good will should remain (not, to be sure, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means in our power), yet would it, like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something which has its full value in itself.
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05Undated
If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favor or (just for this time only) in favor of our inclination. Consequently, if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions. As, however, we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartial judgement, yet it proves that we do really recognize the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all respect for it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions which we think unimportant and forced from us.
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09Undated
Metaphysics... is nothing but the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically. Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason's common principle has been discovered. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that would extend or increase it from experience or even particular intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary. Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex. Dwell in your own house, and you will know how simple your possessions are. - Persius
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16Undated
[To think for oneself] is the maxim of a reason never passive. The tendency to such passivity, and therefore to heteronomy of reason, is called prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to the rules that the understanding places at its basis by means of its own essential law, i.e. is superstition. Deliverance from superstition is called enlightenment; because although this name belongs to deliverance from prejudices in general, yet superstition especially (in sensu eminenti) deserves to be called a prejudice. For the blindness in which superstition places us, which it even imposes on us as an obligation, makes the need of being guided by others, and the consequent passive state of our reason, peculiarly noticeable.
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23Undated
[It] is nevertheless better than the theological concept, of deriving morality from a divine, all-perfect will, not merely because we do not intuit this perfection, but can derive it solely from our concepts, of which morality is the foremost one, but because if we do not do this (which, if we did, would be a crude circle in explanation), the concept of his will that is left over to us, the attributes of the desire for glory and domination, bound up with frightful representations of power and vengeance, would have to make a foundation for a system of morals that is directly opposed to morality.
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